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In Hickynan v. Berens, [1895] 2 Ch. 638, the Court of
Appeal of England has enunciated a rule that seems to
Attorney and rest upon a sound basis of principle, holding that
Client,
when counsel, acting under general instructions
Compromise,
Mistake

given by his client to compromise a litigation, consents to a compromise under a misapprehension, e. g., when,
intending to concede one thing, he inadvertently concedes
another, or when the counsel on both sides do not put the
same interpretation upon the terms of the compromise, neither
the client nor the counsel are bound thereby, and the court:
will set it aside, on application.
The Supreme Court of Georgia has lately conferred upon
the barber fraternity a new distinction, which they will hardly
Baileefor
Hire,
Barber,
Liability for

loss of

covet. In Dilberto v. Haris,23 S. E. Rep. 112,
it held that the proprietor of a barber shop kept
for public patronage is liable to a customer for the

value of his hat, which was deposited on a hat-

property of

Customer

rack in the shop, and which disappeared from the

shop and was lost while the customer was being shaved, since
the proprietor is, in such circumstances, a bailee for hire as to
the ;hat.
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The court does not deign to fortify its decision by any discussion of the questions involved; but Chief Justice BLEAKLEY,
in a dissenting opinion, discourses on the aspects of the
case in a way which, while professedly facetious, contains a
good deal of common sense, and some keen satire. 1"It hath
never happened," he says, "from the earliest times to the
present, that barbers, who are an ancient order of small craftsmen, serving their customers for a small fee, and entertaining
them the while with the small gossip of the town or village,
have been held responsible for a mistake made by one customer whereby he taketh the hat of another from the common rack or hanging place appointed for all customers to
hang their hats; this rack or place being in the same room
in which customers sit to be shaved. The reason is that there
is no complete bailment of the hat. The barber hath no
exclusive custody thereof, and the fee for shaving is too small
to compensate him for keeping a servant to watch it. He
himself could not watch it, and at the same time shave the
owner. Moreover, the value of an ordinary gentleman's hat
is so much, in proportion to the fee for shaving, that to
make the barber an insurer against such mistakes of his
customers would be unreasonable. The loss of one hat
would absorb his earnings for a whole day; perhaps many
days. The barber is a craftsman laboring for wages, not
a capitalist conducting a business of trade or trust."
As a general rule, any one who invites persons to come
into his store or place of business, for the purpose of dealing
with him, will be held liable for whatever articles it may
become necessary that the person so invited should lay aside
while engaged in dealing with the tradesman; and therefore a
dealer in clothing is liable for the loss of valuables or clothing
laid aside while trying on other clothing: Bunndelv. Stern, 122
N. Y. 539; S. C., 25 N. E. Rep. 9io; Woodruff v. Painter,
I5o Pa. 91, and the keeper of a bathing establishment is
liable for the loss of clothing taken from the bath-house or
dressing-room: Bhd v. Everard, 23 N. Y. Suppl. ioo8;
S. C., 4 Misc: Rep. 104, or for the loss of valuables delivered
by him to one who had stolen the check issued therefor,
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-when, by looking at the person who presents the check, he
could perceive that he is not the one to whom the check was
issued: TomMer v. Koelling, 6o Ark. 62; S. C., 28 S. W.
Rep. 795The keeper of a restaurant is liable for the loss of a customer's overcoat or wraps left in his charge, or taken in
charge by his employee: Ultzer v. Nicols, [1894] I Q. B. 92 ;
But/mann v. Denneft, 3o N. Y. Suppl. 247; S. C., 9 Misc.
Rep. 462, but not for overcoats or wraps hung up by the customer himself on a rack provided for the purpose, if he keeps
a vigilant watch over the room: Simpson v. -Rourke,34 N. Y.
Suppl. I I.
A secret contract between persons who propose to bid upon
the construction of a public work, that their bids shall be put
in apparently in competition, but really in concert,
Bids,
with the intention of securing as high a price as
Collusion
possible, and dividing the profits, is illegal, and contrary to
public policy, and will not be enforced, though one of the
parties to it has secured the contract for the work, and has
executed the same and received the profits , McMillan v. Hoffman (Circuit Court, Dist. Oreg.,) 69 Fed. Rep. 509.
In Durkin v. Kingston Coal Co., 33 At. Rep. 237, the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has dealt a severe blow to
Coastitutional the unscrupulous labor legislation that is at
present epidemic. The act of that state of 1891,
LAW,
Liabilityfor June 2, P. L. 176, Art. VIII, § 6, provides that
Negligence
the owners of every anthracite coal mine shall
employ a certified mine foreman, who shall examine the
working places in the mine to see if they are safe, and permit
no one to work in an unsafe place; and Art. XVII, § 8,
declares that " For any injury to person or property occasioned by any violation of this act or anyfailure to comply with
itsprozvigns by an), mineforeman, a right of action shall accrue
to the party zitured againstsaid owner or operator for any direct
damages he may have sustained, thereby." This the court
holds unconstitutional, in a strong opinion by Justice WiL-
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of which the following extract contains the gist: "T"O
see the true character of this legislation we must keep both
lines of objection in mind. We must remember that the
injury complained of is due to the negligence of a fellow
workman, for which the master is responsible neither in law
nor in morals. We must also remember that this fellow work
man has been designated by the state, his duties defined and
his powers conferred by statute, and his employment made
compulsory, under heavy penalties, by the same statute.
Finally, we must remember that it is the negligence of this
fellow servant, whose competency the state has certified, and
whose employment the state has compelled, for which the
employer is made liable. The state says: ' He is competent.
You must. employ him. You shall surrender to his control
the arrangements for the security of your employes.' It then
says, in effect: I If we impose upon you by certifying to the
competency of an incompetent man, or if the man to whom
we commit the conduct of your mines neglects his duty, you
shall pay for our mistake and for his negligence.'"
LIAMS,

The Supreme Court of Rhode Island has recently announced
a very peculiar decision, in Macaulay v. Tierney, 33 At.
Contract In
Restraint of
Trade

Rep. i, holding that an agreement by the merebers of a national association of master plumbers

to withdraw their patronage from any dealer
selling supplies to other than master plumbers is not unlawful,
even though " master plumbers" be construed to mean the
members of said association.
As a general rule, a person has the right to deal with whom
he pleases,-to sell to one, and to refuse to sell to another,
or to buy of one, and refuse to buy of another-without
regard to the motive which actuates him, and he cannot be
held accountable for such action, even if it results in injury
to a third party. He has also a right to use any lawful means he pleases to increase his own trade, though the
direct result of it is to injure the business of another. Further,.
what one man'may thus do, lawfully, any combination of mis
may do collectively, unless their collective action is of such a

PROGRESS OF THE LAW.

nature that it falls within a prohibitive rule of law that does
not apply to individuals. Accordingly, any agreement between
individuals, which has for its object the advancement of their
own trade at the expense of others, by underselling them, by
refusing to deal with them, or by refusing to deal with others
who deal with them, is not such a conspiracy or combination
in restraint of trade as to render the agreement unlawful, or
their acts a cause of action: Mfogul Steamship Co. v. McGregor,
[1892] App. Cas. 25, affirming 23 Q. B. D. 598; Bawen v.
Matheson, 14 Allen, 499; Bolin .Jfg. Co. v. Hollis, 54 Minn.
223; S. C., 55 N.
V. Rep. 1119; Paynev. lVestern & Atl.
R. R. Co., 81 Tenn. 507. But if the acts of the parties to the
agreement are such that they do not serve a legitimate purpose, but appear to be wanton and malicious, an action will
lie at the suit of the party injured. This is clearly the case
when the parties defendant and complainant are not in direct
competition, but dependent the one on the other, as when a
combination of wholesalers refuse to sell to a retailer, or
dealers in supplies refuse to supply a tradesman or manufacturer. Each individual may refuse to sell to the complainant;
but if they agree not to sell to him, or induce others not to sell
to him, they are clearly acting wantonly, and cannot claim that
they are acting within their rights: Delz v. Winfree, 8o Tex.
400; S. C., 16 S. W. Rep. i i i ; Olive v. Van Patten, (Tex.)
25 S. W. Rep. 428. Such an agreement is a combination in
restraint of trade, and therefore illegal ; and the very act of
inducing another to refuse to deal with the complainant is also
illegal. In Jackson v. Stanfeld, (Ind.) 36 N. E. Rep. 345, the
defendant was an active member of "The Retail Lumber
Dealers' Association of Indiana," an organization whose
by-laws gave an active member a claim against a wholesaler
for selling to a person not a " regular dealer " in.that member's community, and required members to refuse to patronize
a wholesaler who ignored the decision of the committee
appointed to hear the claim. The plaintiff, who was not a
"regular dealer," underbid the defendant on a contract, but
wholesalers refused to sell to him, because the defendant had
previously enforced a claim against a wholesaler who had sold
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to the plaintiff, and expressed an intention of continuing to.
enforce such claims; and the plaintiff was consequently
obliged to abandon the contract. It was held that the defendant was liable for the amount which the plaintiff lost by
abandoning his contract, and would be perpetually enjoined
from making a claim under the by-laws of the association
against any one who sold to the plaintiff.
It is on this ground of wanton injury that the illegality of a
boycott rests. As usually practiced, it has for its immediate
object the destruction of the trade of the person boycotted, if
he does not comply with some demand made upon him, with
the ulterior design of some benefit to the boycotters therefrom; and is not intended primarily to benefit them, with the
destruction of the other's trade as an unfortunate, if necessary,
incident. This makes the distinction between a legal agreement and an illegal conspiracy. If the facts in any case
prove the latter state of affairs to exist, the agreement and the
acts done under it are legal, unless, as has been said, the combination is so extensive as to equal a restraint of trade; but if
the former condition is proved to exist, the combination and
all acts done in pursuance thereof are illegal. In the case in
hand, the primary object of the agreement was- not to benefit
the business of those who entered into it, but to punish the
dealer who acted in opposition to their desires, and, pace the
court, was therefore illegal; and the complainant was entitled
to damages.

The Court of Appeal of England has recently given a very
clear and important definition of the duties of auditors in
condition of
Corporations, examining and reporting the financial
Auditors,
Duties

a corporation. It held, that though it is not incumbent on them to consider whether the business of

the corporation is conducted prudently or imprudently, yet
it is to consider and report to the stockholders whether
the balance sheet exhibits a true and correct statement of the
condition of the affairs of the corporation, and the true financial
position of tho company at the time of the audit. This must
be ascertained by examining the books of the corporation; and
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they must take reasonable cafe that what they certify as to the
company's financial position is true. And it is also their duty,
cxcept in very special cases, to place before the stockholders
the necessary information as to the true financial position of
the corporation, not merely to indicate the means of acquiring
it. Accordingly, in the case in hand, when an auditor presented a confidential report to the directors, calling their attention to the insufficiency of the securities in which the capital
of the company was invested, and the difficulty of realizing
them, but in his report to the stockholders merely stated that
the value of the assets was dependent on realization, with the
result that the stockholders were deceived as to the condition
of the corporation, and a dividend was declared out of capital,
and not out of income, it was held that the auditor had been
guilty of misfeasance under § io of the Companies' (Windingup) Act, x890, and was liable to make good the amount of the
dividend paid: Zn re London & General Bank (No. 2),
[1895] 2 Ch. 673. It had been previously decided that the
auditors of a corporation are " officers" within this act: In re
London & General Bank, [1895] 2 Ch. 166.
According to the Court of Chancery of New Jersey, a corporation organized under the laws of that state, which is in an
insolvent condition, cannot prefer one of its officers
Preference
of Officers as as a creditor; and, therefore, when the president
of a corporation then insolvent, who was also its
Creditors
creditor to a large amount for cash advanced, brought suit
against it on one day, resigned as president and director the
next day, and on the third day the directors accepted his
resignation, and authorized an attorney to give a cognovit, on
which judgment was at once entered, it was held that the
president could not have preference by virtue of that judgment: Jfallor, v. Kirkpatrick, 33 Atl. Rep. 205.
Where individuals associate themselves for the purpose of
promoting and organizing a corporation for the pecuniary gain
of its members, and act as an association by electIndividual ing directors and other officers through whom
Liability
contracts ate made for and in the name of the
proposed corporation, and they afterwards abandon their pur-
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pose to form a corporation; their relation, one to the other, as
to persons dealing with the association, if not that of partners,
is that of agent and principal, and each will be individually
liable upon any contracts of the association which he directly
or indirectly authorized or ratified. START, C. J., in Roberts
Mfg. Co. v. Schlick, (Supreme Court of Minnesota,) 64 N. W.
Rep. 826.
The Supreme Court of the United States, in United States v.
-American Bell Telephone Co., i6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 69, has lately
rendered a decision of great importance, as defining
Federal,
the jurisdiction of that court and the Circuit Court
Appellate
of Appeals. By § 6 of the Judiciary Act of 189 1,
Jurisdiction

March 3, 26 Stat. at Large, 828, the decision of
the Circuit Court of Appeals is made final "in all cases arising
under the patent laws." This the Supreme Court holds to
refer only to suits at law and in equity for infringement, and to
suits in equity for interference and to obtain patents, but not
to suits brought by the United States to cancel patents, and
therefore an appeal will lie in such cases from the Circuit Court
of Appeals to the Supreme Court.
The Australian Ballot Law of Massachusetts (Stat. 1893,
c. 417,) has just been declared constitutional:

Elections,
Constitutional
Law

Cole v. Tucker, (Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts,) 41 N. E. Rep. 681.
In Parker v. Orr,41 N. E. Rep. 1oo0, the Supreme Court
of Illinois has decided a number of questions arising under the
Ballot Law of that state, holding
Ballots,
Validity
(i) That under that statute the provision that
the voter shall prepare his ballot by marking in the appropriate margin or place a cross opposite the names of the
candidates of his choice, is directory merely, and does not, as
does the Indiana statute, render invalid ballots which show on
their face that the voters attempted to make a cross in the
proper place, but did not fully succeed in doing so; and that
ballots marked, with a cross made either by crossing the line
diagonally (X) or vertically (±), were valid:

PROGRESS OF THE LAW.

(2) That writing the word "Yes" or " Get " in the square
at the margin of an affirmative vote for a constitutional amendment does not avoid the ballot:
(3) That signing the voter's name to the ballot invalidates
it, as it tends to impair the secrecy of the ballot:
(4) That the making of any mark which bears no resemblance to a cross, such as a single stroke, or a circle, or a
nondescript scribble, or writing out the party name, or placing
a cross wholly outside the proper square, will invalidate the
ballot for the same reason:
(5) That the erasure of a name with a lead pencil is not a
distinguishing mark:
(6) That when a voter makes crosses opposite the names
-of two political parties, one of which has no candidate for a
particular office, the vote is good only as to the candidate for
that office on the other ticket, and a nullity as to the rest:
(7) That when a voter writes in the name of a candidate of
his own, and marks a cross so that it is uncertain which candidate it refers to, his vote does not count for either.
In determining the validity of ballots cast under the Australian ballot laws, the fact that the stamp (when one is
required,) was not placed on the ballot with such
Distinguish.
ing Marks
precision as to make a single, perfect impression,
will not render the ballot invalid; but if, in the preparation of
the ballot, there is such a departure from the strict letter of
the law-, that, if purposely done, the ballot could be known by
the voter casting it, as when there are imprinted on it two
separate and distinct impressions of the stamp, or when there
is within one of the large squares a distinct mark, as of a
pencil, in addition to the voter's stamp, the ballot will be
rejected on the ground that it bears a distinguishing mark,
though the mark was made innocently: Zeis v. Passwater,
(Supreme Court of Indiana,) 41 N. E. Rep. 796.
Who dare say, "De minimis non cu-at lex ? " The pencil
mark in this case was one-fourth of an inch wide and fivesixteenths of an inch long. What man could say with certainty, " I made that mark? "
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In Williams v. QuebradaRaiway, Land & Copper Co., [ 18951
2 Ch. 751, Judge KEKEWICH, of the Chancery Division of
England, has laid down the salutary rule, that
Evidence,
when fraud is alleged against a defendant, comPrivileged
Communica- munications between himself and his solicitor as
tions,

Discovery,
Fraud

to the subject-matter of the alleged fraud are not
privileged from production, there being no distinc-

tion in this respect between a crime and a civil fraud; and that
it is immaterial for this purpose, whether the solicitor is or is
not a party to the alleged fraud.
In Morgan v. Kennedy, 64 N. V. Rep. 912, the Supreme
the
Husband and Court of Minnesota has lately held, that
Wife,
common-law rule that holds a husband liable in
Husbands

damages for slanderous words uttered by his wife,
though he is not present, and has not in any
Wife
manner participated in the slander,
has not been
abrogated by the passage of the statutes relating to married
women, and enlarging their property rights.
Liabilityd's
Slander by

The Court of Appeal of England, in Robins v. Gra',,
[1895] 2 Q. B. 501, has affirmed the judgment of WILLS, J.,
in the court below, [1895] 2 Q. B. 78. In this
Innkeeper,
Lien,
case a commercial traveler employed by a firm
Goods of

Commercial
Traveler

that dealt in sewing-machines went to stay at an
inn, and while there machines were sent to him by

his employers in the ordinary course of business for the purpose of selling them to customers in the neighborhood.
Before the goods were sent the innkeeper had express notice
that they were the property of the employers, but he received
them as the baggage of the traveler. The latter subsequently
left the inn without paying for his board and lodging; and it
was held that the innkeeper had a lien on the goods for the
amount of his bill.
The Circuit Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit, has recently
decided a very interesting point of insurance law. An accident
certificate issued by the Odd Fellows' Accident
Insurance,
Accident,
Association provided that written notice should be
Notice
given to the insurer, within ten days of the date
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of the accident and injury for which a claim should be made,
stating the circumstances of the accident and the nature of the
injury, and that there should be no claim to death benefits
unless death resulted within ninety days from the accident, of
which accident the insurer should have had notice within ten
days. While this certificate was in force, the plaintiff, assured
stepped on a wire nail, inflicting a small but visible wound in
his foot. He continued to pursue his usual occupation for
fourteen days, and was then taken ill and died from lockjaw
resulting from the wound. No notice of the accident was
given within ten days after it occurred, but proofs of death were
furnished in due time. Under these circumstances, it was held
that the terms of the certificate did not require notice to be
given within ten days of the happening of an accident which
did not immediately disable the assured from pursuing his
usual occupation, and which did not, within the ten days, give
rise to a claim for death benefits; and that the beneficiary was
therefore entitled to recover: Odd Fellows' FraternalAccident
Association of America v. Earl,70 Fed. Rep. 16.

According to a recent decision of the Judicial Committee
of the Privy Council of England, under the treaties between
International Great Britain and Japan, by virtue of which the
consular courts of the former and the territorial
Law,
Jurisdiction of
consular

courts

courts of the latter have exclusive jurisdiction
over claims against British and Japanese subjects

respectively, it would be in excess of the jurisdiction granted
to the British consular court if it were to entertain by way of
counter-claim or cross-action a claim by a British defendant
against a Japanese plaintiff; the cognizance of such a claim
belongs to the territorial courts. This rule was applied to a
suit by the Emperor of Japan against a steam-boat company
for damages resulting from a marine collision, in which the
defendant company counterclaimed in respect of the same collision, on the ground that it was due to the negligence of the
plaintiff's servants; and it was accordingly held that the
counter-claim could not be sustained: The Imperial Japanese
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-Government v. Peninsldar& Oriental Steam Nay. Co., [1 895]
App. Cas. 644.
According to a recent decision of the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania, packages of oleomargarine, weighing ten pounds
each, put up out of the state, andisent into it, by
Interstate
Commerce, the manufacturer, to be there sold by his resident
Original agent from his store, by the package, are not
Package
" original packages," within the
interstate commerce clause of the United States Constitution, but, being
intended for sale to the consumer, and being in fact so sold,
are subject to the police regulations of the state : Commonwcalth v. Paul, 33 Atl. Rep. 82.
In reaching this remarkable conclusion, the court rests
wholly on its own decisions to the same effect, in Commonwealth v. Zelt, 138 Pa. 615 ; S. C., 21 Atl. Rep. 7, and Comiiwnwealth v. Schollenberger, 156 Pa. 201 ; S. C., 27 Atl. Rep.
30, which in their turn rest on the newly discovered principle
that "a manufacturer who puts up his products in packages
evidently adapted for and intended to meet the requirements
of an unlawful retail trade in another state, and sends them to
his own agent in that state, for sale to consumers, is not
engaged in interstate commerce, but is engaged in an effort
to carry on a forbidden business by masquerading in a character
to which he has no honest title." There is also a good deal
said in regard to the dire and awful consequences which would
result from the opposite doctrine, and the learned judge who
delivered the opinion declares that "we cannot adopt a construction that seems to us so unnatural and unreasonable, and
that would work such absurd and monstrous results," meaning thereby the construction 'which would hold the separate
packages, shipped in an open box or barrel, an original package. But the very strength of his language betrays the weakness of his argument. It is not necessary to vituperate when
one is sure of his position.
It is the general opinion that when the bottles or other
vessels in which the goods are put up, though each enclosed
in a separate wrapper, are put into one common receptacle for
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the purpose of transportation, that receptacle is the original
package, and, when that receptacle is opened, and the contents
are separated, the original package is broken, and none of the
separately wrapped packages can be called original. The
importer may put up and ship his packages separately in any
form he pleases ; but, if he puts them up together in the same
box or barrel, he cannot claim that they are original packages. The presumption in such a case is that the separate
wrapping is a mere device to evade the law: In re Hamon,
43 Fed. Rep 372; Hai-rrison v. State, 91 Ala. 62; S. C., io
So. Rep. 30; Smith v. State, 54 Ark. 248; S.C., 15 S. W.
Rep. 882; State v. Parsons, 124 M1o. 436; S. C., 27 S. W.
Rep. 1102; Hale' v. State, (Neb.) 6o N. W. Rep. 962;
Commonrwealth v. Zelt, 138 Pa. 615 ; S. C., 21 At]. Rep. 7;
Commonwealthi v. Schiollenberger, 156 Pa. 201; S. C., 27
At. Rep. 30; State v. Chapman, i S. Dak. 414; S. C., 47
N. W. Rep. 41 1. If, however, the carrier puts the separate
bottles or packages into a receptacle furnished by itself, for its
own convenience in transporting them, without the knowledge
of the consignor, the receptacle is not the original package.
Keith v. State, (Ala.) 8 So. Rep. 353; Tinker v. State, 96
Ala. 115 ; S. C., I i So. Rep. 383.
The Iowa courts alone have seen the absurdities to which
this doctrine will lead, and have held that in such a case the
separately wrapped bottle or package is the original: State v.
Coonan, 82 Iowa, 400; S. C., 48 N. W. Rep. 921 ; State v.
3Tfdl,, 86 Iowa, 638 ; S. C., 53 N. W. Rep. 33o. But this,
if applied indiscriminately, is as far wrong as the other doctrine. The only safe rule is, to leave to the jury, as a question
of fact, to find whether the separate packages or the receptacle
is the original package in any given case, under instructions
that if they find that the intent of the importer was to evade
the law, not to assert bona fitle his rights under the interstate
commerce rule, that they should find the receptacle to be the
original package; otherwise, the separate bottles or packages. To assert that a pint bottle of whisky, wrapped separately, and then boxed with others, is an original package, is
absurd; but it is equally absurd to claim that a ten-pound
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package of anything is an intentional evasion of the law.
And this absurdity cannot be rendered serious argument by
.an assertion that it is an evasion of the law, because the pack.ages are plainly put up to sell at retail. The law makes no
distinction between wholesale and retail sales; and the rules
of interstate commerce extend their protection equally over
-each. If, in the case in hand, the packages of oleomargarine
had weighed but an ounce, and yet had been separately
wrapped, and carried by the dealer into the state in separate
pockets of his overcoat, they would have been original packages, in spite of the evident purpose of selling them at retail;
and yet, if two hundred pound packages should be shipped in
one box, for convenience sake, they would not be such, under
this ruling, although just as clearly intended for wholesale
dealing. "A Daniel come to judgment, yea, a Daniel !"
When an attorney of record receives from the defendant a
sum less than the amount due on a judgment against the
latter, and satisfies the judgment without the conJudgment,
Satisfaction, sent of his client, the satisfaction will be vacated
vacating
only on the terms that the plaintiff release and
discharge the defendant from the judgment to the extent of
the payment made to the attorney: Faughnan v. Cit' of
Elizabeth, (Supreme Court of New Jersey,) 33 Atl. Rep. 212,
1895.

Since the existence of all committees, in the absence of
legislation, necessarily determines upon the adjournment of
Parliamentary the body to which they belong, there must be an
explicit enactment that the sessions of the comLaw,
Committees, mittee can be held after such adjournment, or, at
Authority
least, a clear implication to that effect from the
words used in the act or resolution creating the committee,
to prevent this determination. Therefore, when a committee
is created by the legislature from its own members, to
investigate certain facts, and report to the legislature, if it
should be possible to do so before its adjournment, and if
not, then to the Supreme Court, the committee can do
nothing after the adjournment of the legislature, except make
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its report: Commercial& Farmers' Bank v. Worth, (Supreme
Court of North Carolina,) 23 S. E. Rep. 16o.
In Kendall v. Board of Education of City of Grand Rapids,
64 N. W. Rep. 745, the Supreme Court of Michigan recently
Suspension of
By-law by
Vote on
Motion

decided an interesting point of parliamentary law.

A by-law of the board provided that no text-book
should be adopted unless proposed at a regular

meeting at least one month before its adoption;
but by-laws could be suspended by a two-thirds vote of the
members present. A report recommending the adoption of a
text-book was made, and a motion to lay the report on the
table was lost by a two-thirds vote, after which the book was
adopted by a majority vote. It was held that the by-law
requiring the book to be proposed one month before its
adoption was suspended by the defeat, by a two-thirds vote,
of the motion to lay the report on the table, and that the
adoption of the text-book was therefore valid.
The act of Indiana of 1889, March 9; Rev. Stat. Ind.
1894, §§ 5 186, 5187, requires railroad companies to place in
each passenger depot where there is a telegraph
Railroads,
Notice of
office a blackboard, and note thereon whether
Latenessof
trains are late, and if so, how late; and provides
Trains,

Constitutional
Law

that half the fine recovered for violation thereof
shall go to the prosecuting attorney. This statute

has lately undergone a thorough overhauling by the Supreme
Court of that State, in Pennsylvania Co. v. State, 41 N. E.
Rep. 937, and was held constitutional in spite of the many
objections that were made against it. In the opinion, it is
decided
(i.) That it is not void for ambiguity:
(2.) That it is not a regulation of interstate commerce,
-within the prohibition of the federal constitution:
(3.) That it is not unconstitutional, as being a local or
special act, regulating practice, in courts' of justice, on the
ground that it provides for special judgments in favor of particular persons and against particular persons; or that it provides a special statutory action, and authorizes a particular judg-
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ment in favor of a particular officer against particular persons;
or because it gives a particular officer a part of a penalty, and
thereby requires judgment in favor of such officer:
(4.) That it is not local or special, within the prohibition of
the constitution of that state against passing local or special
laws "in relation to fees or salaries, "merely because the prosecuting attorney participates in the recovery, or on the theory
that the defendant, aside from its interest in common with
that of the people of the state, has an interest in the distribution of the fund recovered as a penalty for its violation of the
act :
(5.) That it is not unconstitutional, as granting to any citizen,
or class of citizens, privileges or immunities which do not
belong equally to all citizens on the same terms:
(6.) That it does not violate the provisions of the federal
constitution, that no state shall deny to any person the equal
protection of its laws :
(7.) That the fact that there is a railway in the State which
has no station or telegraph facilities, but is operated by a
system of telephone, to which railway the act does not apply
for that reason, does not expose it to the objection that it
lacks uniformity.
The appellate court of the same state has lately held that
this same act does not require the registering of night trains
at passenger stations where its telegraph office is kept open
only during the day-time: Terre Haute & Ind. R. R. Co. v.
State, 41 N. E. Rep. 952, and by a parity of reasoning, it would
in any case require the registering only while any telegraph
office is open.
This statute is a proper police regulation, which does not
interfere with interstate commerce, and is within the power of
the legislature : State v. Indiana & Illinois Southern R. R. Co.,
133 Ind. 69; S. C., 32 N. E. Rep. 817.
It is operative only when the company or person operating
the railroad possesses the means of conveying such information to the point where it is to be noted: State v. Indiana &
Illinois Southern R. R. Co., 133 Ind. 69; S. C., 32 N. E. Rep.
817, and therefore does not apply to stations where there are
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no telegraph offices: State v. Indiana & Illinois Southern
R. R. Co., 133 Ind. 69; S. C., 32 N. E. Rep. 817; State v.
Cleveland, Cincinnati, Chicago & St. L. Ry. Co., 8 Ohio Cir.
Ct. 604. Nor to railroads whose trains cover their entire
route in a time less than that within which the notice is to be
posted : State v. Kentucky & Ohio Bridge Co., 136 Ind. 195 ;
S. C., 35 N. E. Rep. 991. The fact that some other company
may operate its line of road by telephone, or by some other
means of communication, does not invalidate the law, which is
confined to those operated by telegraph, on the ground that
it is class legislation, for the law applies to all alike who operate roads by means of telegraphic information: State v. Indiana & Illinois Southern R. R. Co., 133 Ind. 69; S. C., 32
N. E. Rep. 817; State v. Pennsylvania Co., 133 Ind. 700;
S. C., 32 N. E. Rep. 822. The fact that the law gives to the
prosecuting attorney an interest in the amount recovered
does not affect the validity of the law, as that is a matter in the
discretion of the legislature in fixing the compensation of that
officer: State v. Indiana & Illinois Southern R. R. Co., 133
Ind. 69; S. C., 32 N. E. Rep. 817.
When an act, which purports to amend a previous act "so
,as to read as follows," contains a provision different from that
of the original act, but on the same subject, it is
Statutes,
Amendment, not a repeal of the previous act, and therefore
Effect
other statutory provisions relating to the old act,
and not inconsistent with the amendment, will apply to the
latter: Fitzgeraldv. Lewis, (Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts,) 41 N. E. Rep. 687.
The Supreme Court of Florida, in State. v. Green, 18 So.
Rep. 334, has recently reasserted some principles of statutory
construction, which, though frequently expressed,
are yet by no means universally adhered to, and
are therefore well worth repeating.
(i) The constitutional requirements as to the mode of enacting laws are mandatory, and if the journals kept by the two
houses are silent !as to matters which are required to be entered
in them, or if they show affirmatively and explicitly that other
Validity,
Legislative
Journals
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constitutional requirements have not been complied with in
the enactment of a law, the evidence of the journals will control, and the act be held void; but, since every reasonable
presumption must be made in favor of the action of the legislature in the apparent performance of its legal functions, it will
not be presumed, in any case, from the mere silence of the
journal, that either house has disregarded a constitutional
requirement in the enactment of a law, unless the constitution
has expressly required the journal to show the action taken.
In such case, however, their silence will be fatal to the act:
(2) Since the governor acts as a part of the law-making
power of the state in approving bills pa~sed by the legislature,
and unless substantially the same bill that passed the two
houses of the legislature is submitted to him for approval, it
cannot become a law by his approval, or by his silence, or
against his approval:
(3) If the title of an act as it passed the legislature, and
when approved by the governor, is so essentially different as
to affect the whole act, it cannot be said that theTite
same act received the sanction of the entire legislative department of the government; but if the difference is
immaterial and unsubstantial, it will not avoid the law:
(5) The rule of construction, that, though part of an act be
void, it will not render the whole inoperative, if the good and
the bad can be separated, and the legislative purpose expressed
in the valid portions be given effect to, independently of the
void part, applies also to the titles of acts; and if the unconstitutional part can be separated from the other, the latter will
stand, and the act be construed with reference to the subject
therein expressed.
It will be seen from this, that the Florida court has little
sympathy with the absurd idolatry that sees in an enrolled.
bill a thing too holy to touch, before which, no matter how
tainted with fraud, all principles of law and justice must lie
inert, if the subject-matter is within the constitutional limits.
Attention has been called to the results of that doctrine in
commenting on the case of Carr v. Coke, (N. C.,) 22 S. E.
Rep. 16; (See 2 Am. LAw REG. & REv., N. S. 441, 503,) and.
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this decision is now submitted as a very useful antidote to the
injurious effects of that.
The Supreme Court of Ohio has recently decided that an
act which, professing to impose a tax on inheritances, exempts
Taxation,

from taxation the right to receive or succeed to

Constitutional
Law

estates not exceeding S2o,oo, though taxing the
whole right of receiving or succeeding to estates

which exceed that sum in value, and taxes the right to receive
or succeed to estates of a large value at a higher rate per cent.
than the right of succession to estates of smaller value, is in
conflict with § 2 of the bill of rights of the constitution of that
state, which declares that "all political power is inherent in
the people. Government is instituted for their equal protection
and benefit;" and is, therefore, wholly unconstitutional and
void : State v. Frris,41 N. E. Rep. 579.
In [Vinstock, Lubin & Co. v. 31arks, 42 Pac. Rep. 142, the
Supreme Court of California has held that a tradesman, by
adopting the name -Mechanics' Store" for his
Trade
Names
place of business, may acquire a property right
therein as a trade-name, so that equity will enjoin another
from using the name ' Mechanical Store" in such a way as to
induce persons to purchase goods from him under the belief
that they are dealing with the former.
In this case a merchant had erected a building of peculiar
architecture adjoining a similar building occupied by an old
firm engaged in a like business, and with the purMandatory
Injunction
pose of deceiving the customers of the firm,
adopted a similar name, and refrained from using any sign
about the building to designate the proprietor. The court
below decreed that he should maintain and place in a conspicuous part of his store, and also in a conspicuous place on
the outside or front thereof, a sign showing the proprietorship
of the store, in letters sufficiently large to be plainly observable by passers-by and customers entering therein; but it was
held by the Supreme Court that this was holding the defendant
to too strict a rule, and that all that should be required was
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that the defendant, in the conduct of his business, should distinguish his place of business from that in which the plaintiff
carried on its business, in some mode or form that sh6uld be
a sufficient indication to the public that it was a different place
of business from that of the plaintiff.
The House of Lords has lately held, affirming the decision
of the Court of Appeals, [1895] i Ch. 145, that the owner of
land containing underground water, which perWaters,
-Percolation, colates by undefined channels and flows to the
Interference land of a neighbor, has the right to divert or
-appropriate the percolating water within his own lands, by
-wells or drainage shafts, so as to deprive his neighbor of it;
and his right is the same whether his motive be to bonafide
improve his own land, or to maliciously injure his neighbor,
or to induce his neighbor to buy him out: Jlayor, &c., of Bradford v. Pickles, [1895] App. Cas. 597.
No one can be held liable for damages caused by sinking a
well in his own ground, by which the percolating waters are
diverted from his neighbor's wells or springs; but if he sinks a
well to a plainly-defined underground water-course and diverts
it, he is liable for all damages occasioned thereby: Willis v.
City of Perry, (Iowa,) 6o N. W. Rep. 727 ; Castalia Trout
Club v. Castalia Sporting Club, 8 Ohio Cir. Ct. 194 ; Williams
v. Ladew, 161 Pa. 283 ; S. C., 29 Atl. Rep. 54: Sullivan v.
Northern Spy Min. Co., (Utah,) 40 Pac. Rep 709.
According to a recent decision of the Court of Appeal of
England, a gift for the encouragement of a mere sport, though
it may be beneficial to the public, cannot be upheld
Will,
as charitable; and therefore a bequest of a fund in
Charitable
Glift,
Bequest for trust to provide annually forever a cup to be given
to the most successful yacht of the season, though
Encouragement of Sport. it states that the object of the gift is to encourage
the sport of yacht racing, is in violation of the rule against
perpetuities, and void: In re Nottage, [1895] 2 Ch. 649.
The one essential feature of a charitable gift is. that it should
be for the benefit of the public, not for that of any number of
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private individuals. It is not necessary that its benefits should
be bestowed upon the public uniformly; it is sufficient if they
are open to all who under the circumstances can avail themselves of them: c. g%, a hospital is a charitable institution,
because it exists for the benefit of the sick of the community,
so far as its resources extend, and also tends to lighten the
burden which the support of those sick persons whom it cares
for would throw upon the community; but a beneficial society
is not a charity, unless its aims are such as bring it within the
last-mentioned criterion, for it exists for the benefit of its own
members only. Applying this broad rule, a bequest to a
society founded for the dissemination of knowledge generally:
Bcaumnont v. Oliveira, 4 L. R. Ch. 309; for the maintenance
of missions: Commissionei-s v. Pemsel, [189 1] App. Cas. 531 ;
for the erection of a chapel and the maintenance of a public
park: -fit rc Barlett, ("Mass.) 40 N. E. Rep. 899; for the relief
of the poor and the support of a sabbath-school : Conklin v.
Davis, 63 Conn. 377 : S. C., 28 Atl. Rep. 537; for founding
and maintaining an institution for the purpose of studying and
curing the diseases of animals and birds useful to man, and
providing for free lectures to be given to the public: Universit , of London v. 'ra-ow, i DeG. & J. 72, affirming 23 Beav.
159: for the increase and encouragement of good servants :
Lascombc v. WTHtringham, 13 Beav 87 ; for the establishment
of a fund to be expended in prizes to marksmen: n i-e
Stephens, W. N. [1892] 14o: and to enable a corporation,
organized for the purpose, to purchase land and erect residences thereon for the laboring classes, to be controlled "so
as to improve the moral, physical and intellectual condition of
the youth of this city," which residences were to be let to
igfgin,
laborers for rent, and not gratuitously: Webster v. WM
(R. I.) 31 Att. Rep. 824, are charitable gifts. Such is also a
gift to a library, organized as a private corporation, if not
organized for pecuniary profit, and not conducted for that
purpose, when all the moneys obtained by it are used to maintain the library and purchase books, and all are entitled to the
use of the books in the library room, though books may be
taken therefrom only by those who become subscribers for a
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fixed time and pay a certain fee, or who pay a certain amount
for each book without becoming subscribers : Phillps v. Harrow, (Iowa,) 61 N. V. Rep. 434; but a library maintained
only for the benefit of the subscribers is not a charity, even
though all who wish may become subscribers: Carne v. Long,
2 DeG., F. & J. 75 ; In re Dutton, 4 Exch. D. 54.
A charity need not necessarily be for an indefinite number
of persons; and though a beneficial society whose benefits are
confined to its own members is not a charity, yet a gift to the
permanent fund of such an organization of public employes is
a charitable gift, because it is not only in ease of all of those
employes who may choose to become members, but tends to
benefit the community by preventing their families from
becoming a public charge: Inb re Jeanes's Estate, 3 D. R. (Pa.)
314; S. C., 34 W. N. C. 19o.
On the other hand, a gift for the purpose of establishing a
museum for the purpose of preserving relics of famous men is
not a charity: Thomson v. Shakespear, i DeG., F. & J.
399. Nor is one for the maintenance of certain animals,
though, not being a perpetuity, it is a valid trust : In reDean,
41 Ch. D. 552. And if a valid charitable gift is itself conditional on the happening of a future and uncertain event, it
violates the rule against perpetuities, and is void: Alt v.
Lord Stratheden, [1894] 3 Ch. 265.
In a recent case in the Chancery Division of England,
before Judge KEKEWICH, part of a testator's estate consisted of
mortLife Estate, policies on the life of another, subject to a
insurance gage to the life assurance office. By his will he
Policies
bequeathed his personal estate to one person for
life, with remainders over. After the testator's death his
executor paid the premiums on the policies and the interest on
the mortgage out of the income of the personal estate until the
death of the assured, when the office paid to the executor the
surplus of the policy moneys remaining after deducting the
mortgage debt. On these facts, it was held that, as between
the tenant for life and the remaindermen, the amount of income
expended in paying the premiums and interest ought to be
recouped to the tenant for life, with interest, out of the prop-
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erty preserved by the expenditures, viz.: the surplus policy
moneys; and that the balance of that surplus must be apportioned between capital and income: In re Morley, [895]
2 Ch. 738.
In calculating the proportions in which outstanding personal
estate which falls in during the existence of a life estate,
should be divided between capital and income, the proper
method is to ascertain the sum which, put out at the legal
rate of interest on the day of the testator's death, and accumulating at compound interest calculated at that date with yearly
rests and deducting income tax, would, with the accumulations of interest, have produced, at the day of receipt, the
amount actually received; and the sum so ascertained should
be treated as capital, and the rest as income: In re Earl of
Chesterfield's YTrusts, 24 Ch. D. 643.

